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However, testing the latter prediction directly is not an easy task because many 69 surprises experienced by children at school and in other activities are not usually ob-70 served in surveys. We propose to use self-reported school satisfaction as a convenient 71 variable for predicting changes in schooling and risky behavior of adolescents. This 72 follows Lévy-Garboua and MontmarquetteÕs (2004) interpretation of job satisfaction 73 as the workerÕs experienced or post-decisional preference for her job in comparison 74 with alternatives. By a straightforward adaptation to childrenÕs behavior, we claim 75 that the child who reports her satisfaction or dissatisfaction with school manifests 76 her intention to either respect the current educational norm or deviate from it in 77 the near future in specified directions. Moreover, as the intention and subsequent 78 behavior reveal successive states of the childÕs preference, the same type of equations 79 can be used in a sequence to predict both school satisfaction and future risky behav-80 ior. This is implemented with unique panel data (Add Health survey) on the health-81 related behaviors of US adolescents attending middle or high school. School dissat-82 isfaction is found to have a significant positive effect upon nine different types of 83 risky behavior. 84 The theoretical foundations of the paper are provided in Sections 2 and 3. We ex-85 tend the standard human capital model to joint human investment (education) and 86 disinvestment (risky behavior). Based on this model, we develop a general dynamic 87 framework to analyze the preference formation of children and behavioral change at 88 school. Data and empirical strategy are described in Section 4. Then the main results 89 are presented and discussed in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 concludes. 
93
We describe the rational behavior of adolescents who should normally attend 94 middle or high school. It is assumed that they are conscious of the investment value 95 of schooling and devote time and effort to their own education in relation with the 96 returns that they expect to derive from the latter in their future working life. How-97 ever, in contrast with older students and adult workers, they depend materially and 98 financially on one parent or tutor at least, and are unwilling or unable to work for 99 their living. 1 The child lives T + 1 periods. Schooling is the current period followed 100 by T periods of working life. In order to examine the trade-off between education 101 and risky behavior of adolescents, we posit these terms in the standard human cap-102 ital framework. ''Education'' is taken in the broad sense of human capital, which 103 includes schooling, a healthy lifestyle and all leisure activities (e.g., sports, piano 104 lessons) that parents and teachers normally consider as investments in health, e þ l ¼ 1; 0 6 e; l 6 1.
122 The normative expectation of childÕs behavior is
126 However, parents and teachers are unable to monitor the child in such a way that she 127 educates full time. They merely see to her attending school and not working (even 128 beyond the age of compulsory education). The child remains free to allocate her 129 own time between education and risky behavior under the constraint: e > 0, l < 1. 130 Her utility function can be described by the expected present value of school
134 In Eq. (3), y designates the expected permanent earnings of the child in her working 135 life, i the childÕs positive discount rate (corrected for the finiteness of life) and v(l) the 136 utility that the child derives from time devoted to risky behavior during the schooling 137 period. Future earnings of the child are produced by the initial stock of human cap-138 ital and ability, denoted h, as well as by further investments in education and disin-139 vestments in risky behavior:
143 The rate of return to education r is assumed to be positive, and the rate of depreci-144 ation due to risky behavior a is typically positive but might be negative for illegal 145 behavior. The maximization problem which conditions the childÕs allocation of time 146 is easily derived from Eqs.
(1), (3), (4) and l < 1
150 It does not follow from (5) that the childÕs optimum must coincide with the educa-151 tional norm (2) prescribed by her parents and teachers. This would only happen if
155 For adolescents who adhere to the educational norm set by parents, teachers and leg-156 islators, the present value of education outweighs the marginal present value of risky 157 activities net of future depreciation of human capital. The depreciation of human 158 capital caused by risky behavior facilitates the childÕs compliance with the educa-159 tional norm. Eq. (6) allows us to define the latent decision variable of the child which 160 conditions her education and risky behavior within the schooling period as 
170 2.2. A dynamic model of behavioral change at school
171
The new important point we wish to make at this stage is that all the parameters 172 entering the childÕs latent decision variable (7) and conditioning the discrete choice 173 (8) are revisable cognitions conditional on personal experience and other informa-174 tion. The static model of investment/disinvestment presented in the last sub-section 175 would obtain if the latter were known with certainty at any moment in time. How-176 ever, given the great amount of experience that a child may encounter over her ex-177 tended period of schooling and the contingent nature of perception, it is more 178 reasonable to believe that the child has no given preferences and feels uncertain of 179 her own true preference. This general assumption is introduced by treating the childÕs 180 expectation ES Ã as stochastic (Lévy-Garboua & Montmarquette, 1996). Thus, sur-181 prises experienced by an adolescent at school may lead to revised expectations and 182 behavioral change within the boundaries of schooling.
183
To model this, we divide the schooling period into a number of sub-periods which 184 usually coincide with grades and school years. The decision process is illustrated by 185 Fig. 1 . The child makes a decision of education and risky behavior at the beginning 186 of sub-period t (1 6 t 6 n) which is dictated by ES 
201 Then, assuming a Bayesian revision of the probability distribution (see, for instance, 202 DeGroot, 1970 , chap. 9), the posterior conditional distribution of ES Ã after t random 203 i.i.d. experiences is also a normal distribution with mean:
207 and precision: (s + t)h. This can also be written 3 :
211 with e t S Ã ðtÞ À ES Ã tÀ1 designating the surprise experienced by the individual during 212 her tth experience. Eq. (10) depicts how the latent decision variable of a rational 213 child confronted with dynamic uncertainty (surprises) changes with her experience 214 of school and risky behavior. Behavioral change is caused, literally speaking (see 215 GrangerÕs Nobel lecture, 2004), by the experienced surprises in the short run, and 216 behavior converges to a stable habit in the long run when surprises are serially inde-217 pendent. For instance, a school failure is a bad surprise that diminishes expectations 218 of ability and educational returns. Bad surprises will drive the child to reduce the 219 time and effort devoted to education and to increase the time and effort devoted 220 to risky behavior. By iteration of Eq. (10), we get 3 The marginal distribution ofh is a gamma distribution with an experience-dependent mean value of the posterior distribution which increases indefinitely with experience.
Prior choice of schooling 
224 This last formulation of the decision process shows that an accumulation of bad sur-225 prises (for instance e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e t < 0) may eventually lead ES Ã t to become negative even 226 when ES Ã 0 was not. The adolescent is driven by the succession of bad experiences to 227 breach the educational norm and indulge in risky behavior. (2000) from the same data set support the view that the causality runs from 238 satisfaction to behavior but this causal link has not been firmly established by lack 239 of a proper theory of risky behavior. Previous studies have generally taken a broad 240 view of satisfaction and quality of life while they focused on a single aspect of risky 241 behavior like alcohol and substance abuse. In contrast with earlier studies, we adopt 242 here a narrower view of satisfaction with school but we examine its full impact on a 243 very wide spectrum of risky behavior. By narrowing the scope of satisfaction to 244 school, we gain insight on the interaction between education and risky behavior; 245 by broadening the scope of risky behavior, we capture the multi-faceted nature of 246 the latter. If risky behavior is a substitute for education, school satisfaction will be 247 a more specific predictor for the risky behavior of adolescents than is life satisfaction. 248
The reason why dissatisfaction with school should predict risky behavior is simply 249 that it reveals the childÕs intention to deviate from the current educational norm in 250 the near future. This statement follows from a new interpretation of satisfaction 251 judgments with respect to an individual experience (Lévy-Garboua & Montmar-252 quette, 2004). Self-reported satisfaction is identified to the discrete variable (S in 253 Eq. (8)) which relates to the decision of repeating the experience in the near future. 254 For instance, job satisfaction expresses a workerÕs experienced or post-decisional 255 preference for her job in comparison with alternatives. The model presented in Sec-256 tion 2 posits that such preference is known imperfectly and subject to changes caused 257 by the surprises that were experienced in the past. Thus the same equations (8) and 258 (9) can be used in a sequence to predict prior school choices (just before t), school 259 satisfaction (between t and t + 1), and future school choices or risky behavior (just 260 before t + 1). Panel data are especially appropriate for this purpose. 261
Since this is perhaps the first economic investigation of school satisfaction 262 whereas job satisfaction has been extensively studied by economists in recent years 
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263 under the impetus of Clark and Oswald (1996) , it can be useful to draw the parallel 264 between education and jobs in order to distinguish the specificities of school satisfac-265 tion and school choices. The main similarity is that school choices and job choices 266 are decisions to invest in the future which can both be described in a human capital 267 framework. However, the returns to schooling lie essentially in the future since 268 investment in schooling is made early in life, while a 40-year old worker would have 269 already experienced a great part of the returns from her job decisions in the past. 270 School satisfaction is prospective whereas job satisfaction is partly retrospective. 271 As a result, school satisfaction should be a more accurate predictor of future educa-272 tion behavior than is job satisfaction with respect to job mobility (Lévy-Garboua, 273 Montmarquette, & Simonnet, 2004) . Another important difference between educa-274 tion and jobs which is perhaps less visible is the following: a child who feels unhappy 275 at school will typically have fewer schooling alternatives than a worker who can turn 276 to the job market. A dissatisfied adolescent unable to shift from school to work is 277 almost inevitably confronted with risky alternatives, all the more so as people who 278 face the risk of a large loss become risk-seeking (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) . 279 Lastly, risky behavior breaking the educational norm is by nature more hidden 280 and diffuse than the simple exit-voice alternative to a bad job postulated by Hirsh-281 man (1970) . Our data set enables us to observe many types of risky behavior which 282 correlate with school dissatisfaction. 
284
We used a unique large-scale survey, the National Longitudinal Survey of Ado-285 lescent Health (Add Health, contractual data; Udry, 2003) , which was carefully de-286 signed to explore the causes of health-related behaviors of US adolescents 287 attending middle or high school (grades 7 to 12). Schools and students were drawn 288 from the US population with unequal probabilities in order to over-represent small 289 categories and obtain unbiased estimates by region, urbanization, school type, 290 school size, and ethnic origin (Harris et al., 2003) . The same questionnaire was 291 administered in-home to a large sample of adolescents clustered in 52 middle schools 292 and 80 high schools. On the same occasion, another questionnaire was administered 293 to parents. The children who responded to the in-home questionnaire were observed 294 in two waves, in 1995 and 1996, 4 with 14 738 adolescents still present in the second 295 wave out of 20 745 who had been participating to the first wave. Their educational 296 status and school satisfaction is described from the first wave of in-home interviews. 297 Eighteen manifestations of risky behavior (aggregated in eleven categories) are then 298 described from the second wave of in-home interviews. 299
Survey administrators took several steps to secure confidentiality of the data and 300 minimize biases from self-reporting. Respondents were not provided with any
301 printed questionnaire. The interviewer read the questions aloud and entered the 302 respondentÕs answers on a laptop computer. For sensitive topics like sexual and ille-303 gal behavior or substance use, the adolescents even listened to pre-recorded ques-304 tions through earphones and entered their answers directly on the laptops. 305
Since we interpret adolescentsÕ satisfaction with school as their experienced pref-306 erence for education versus risky behavior at the date of the first in-home survey, we 307 can use Eq. (11) of the theoretical model to predict school satisfaction. The latter is 308 explained by the prior value of this variable and by the sum of school surprises. The 309 prior schooling decision variable can be related to the childÕs background (sex, ethnic 310 origin). The sum of school surprises is partly captured by the gap between the childÕs 311 current school status and her normative expectation, which we call the ''education 312 gap'', and unexpected family events (absent father, absent mother). In addition, 313 school fixed-effects control for the childÕs specific school environment; and satisfac-314 tion with health, parents, friends and neighborhood all together control for unob-315 servable personality traits of the child and for her specific non-school environment. 316 We first estimate the education level and take the regressionÕs residual to measure 317 the education gap. The latter is then incorporated in the school satisfaction equation 318 along with the other explanatory variables. It should have a positive effect on school 319 satisfaction. Testing the satisfaction equation permits to validate the suggested inter-320 pretation of satisfaction judgments in a new domain. Finally, a wide spectrum of ris-321 ky behavior can be predicted one period ahead by the dynamic equation (9). Each 322 form of risky behavior is explained by the same one-year lagged variable which de-323 fines the childÕs prior state, school satisfaction one year back that captures the childÕs 324 intention to deviate from this prior state after experiencing surprises at school and in 325 other activities, and individual characteristics (age, grade, sex, ethnic origin, health 326 and family status) which may have a differential effect on each specific risky 327 behavior. 328 5. Education and school satisfaction 329 Table 1 shows the education equation and summary statistics. The dependent var-330 iable of the education equation is the school grade that children had reached at the 331 time of the in-home survey. The education level of children is estimated by an or-332 dered Probit since we observe six education grades (from 7 to 12) and the latter 333 are not entirely determined by age in the American educational system (20.10% of 334 the sample have repeated or been held back one grade, and 2.37% have skipped 335 one grade). After controlling for childrenÕs age, the results are in line with those 336 which have been commonly found in the economic literature. The role of differences 337 in economic opportunities across families is attested by the significant effect of paren-338 tal income (with a positive sign) and number of siblings (with a negative sign), school 339 size and region (South). The role of differences in school choices and norms is also 340 present through the strong positive coefficients of parentsÕ education, suburban res-341 idence and private school. The childÕs health captures an important aspect of ability. 
26382.424
Significance levels: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%. a Highest school level of parents: 1 = more than 8th but not graduated from high school, 2 = high school graduate, 3 = went to college or other school, 4 = graduated from college or university, 5 = professional training beyond a 4 year college or university. 
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342 Finally, the higher education level of girls, ceteris paribus, may be the consequence of 343 girlsÕ human capital being more severely depreciated than boysÕ by risky behavior 344 like substance use, unprotected sex and violent behavior. 345
The education equation will now be used to calculate the education gap as the 346 estimated residual. The predicted level of education for one adolescent iðŝ i Þ is defined 347 as her expected grade among six possible grades:
350 Probabilities of being in each grade k are computed from Table 1 
355
In order to study school satisfaction, we use the following question from the Add 356 Health In-Home I survey: ''How do you agree or disagree with the following: You 357 are happy to be at your school''. Five ordinal answers are allowed: ''strongly dis-358 agree'', ''disagree'', ''neither agree nor disagree'', ''agree'', and ''strongly agree''. 359 Two-thirds of the respondents were unambiguously ''satisfied'' as they agreed or 360 strongly agreed with this statement. In Table 2 , two decompositions of school satis-361 faction, which both respect the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, are intro-362 duced. The more detailed variable (5 levels) is estimated by an ordered Probit in the 363 first two columns, and a simple dummy variable (satisfied/not satisfied) is estimated 364 by a Probit in the next three columns. Including satisfaction as a dummy makes the 365 presentation and interpretation of marginal effects of the explanatory variables very 366 straightforward. It is reassuring to verify that these two regressions yield similar re-367 sults. Since reporting oneÕs satisfaction with school is like repeating oneÕs prior deci-368 sion of schooling in the light of additional experience, the satisfaction equation at 369 date t + 1 is basically like the education equation at date t plus the additional effect 370 of relevant surprises that occurred in the meantime. The addition of these contem-371 poraneous surprises and other variables in the regression permits the identification 372 of all coefficients. 373
As predicted by Eq. (11), the education gap has a positive effect on 5-level school 374 satisfaction which is significant at the 1% threshold (5% only for 2-level satisfaction). 375 Since the education gap is uncorrelated with the education level, this result shows 376 that satisfaction is caused by surprises, i.e., unexpected deviations from oneÕs norma-377 tive expectation. Moreover, since two-thirds of adolescents are satisfied with their 378 school, the average positive effect of good surprises on the satisfaction variable 379 should be less than the average negative effect of bad surprises. We tested this con-380 jecture by splitting the education gap into two continuous variables, one for a posi-381 tive gap and another for a negative gap (regression not shown). Indeed, a positive 382 gap had no effect on school satisfaction while a negative gap had a strong negative 383 effect (significant at the 1% level). Adolescents should be more vulnerable to unob-384 servable negative shocks on their expected returns to education as the latter get smal- (Becker, 1993) , children become increasingly vulnerable to bad surprises Significance levels: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%. Note: For each of these three variables, there are five response options: ''not at all'', ''very little'', ''somewhat'', ''quite a bit'', ''very much''. We dichotomized the scores as ''satisfied'' (''very much'') versus ''dissatisfied'' (other responses) based on subjectsÕ item responses.
a ''How much do you feel that your parents care about you?'' (satisfied = 85.50%). b ''How much do you feel that your friends care about you?'' (satisfied = 43.23%). c ''On the whole, how happy are you with living in your neighborhood?'' (satisfied = 33.14%). Table 4 Correlation between nine types of risky behavior at time t + 1 (Add Health, In-Home II) (n = 8810)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
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Many controls were introduced in the regressions to account for additional fac-487 tors which favor or impede the adoption of specific risky behavior. For instance, par-488 entsÕ smoking and drinking indicates a lenient educational norm, which facilitates the 489 similar attitude of their children. And girls would be less prone to adopt some risky 490 behaviors (and more eager to study) if they suffered from a higher depreciation of 491 their human capital than boys. However, additional effects of this kind might as well 492 reflect spurious correlations. A given control may be significant if it correlates with 
